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Ulfa leader Ranjan Chowdhury and his Bangladeshi aide Pradip Marak get l_
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Posted : 18 Mar, 2015 00:00:00 | AA-A+ |
Since the Asian financial crisis, central bankers in
Asia have recognised the intricate link between macroeconomic
performance and financial stability. Numerous reforms have since been
initiated, which have improved macro-financial linkages in several Asian
economies.
Regrettably, the story is quite different in
Bangladesh. Despite impressive performance in GDP (gross domestic
product), trade and other macro-economic drivers, Bangladesh often
experiences unprecedented volatility in its financial sector. Strong
macroeconomic indicators are not always reflected through financial
sector performance.
In other
words, macro-financial linkage in Bangladesh is weak. This section
addresses key issues which Bangladesh Bank (BB) needs to address to
enhance macro-financial channels and banking sector performance in
Bangladesh.
INTEGRATING WITH GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS: Capital
openness is expected to benefit capital-scarce countries like Bangladesh
and link the macro-economy with global financial sector. For
Bangladesh, capital account liberalisation may be a key step in breaking
the current 6.0 per cent GDP 'growth-trap'.
As the Asian
Development Bank (ADB) recently pointed out, Bangladesh's Investment-GDP
ratio (currently at 29 per cent) needs to rise to 35 per cent to go
beyond 7-plus growth rates and to around 38 per cent to reach 8.0 per
cent growth rate. Greater integration with global financial markets can
pave the way for this much-needed investment.
The downside is
naturally capital outflow, generally in response to higher external
interest rates, resulting in currency devaluation or foreign exchange
depletion (in case the exchange rate is pegged such as Bangladesh's is
at present).
India's currency crisis in 2013 in response to US
announcement of asset tapering is a prime example. Also, with the US
economy looking stronger than ever, capital outflow from emerging
markets is once again on the cards.
Until 2008, foreign borrowing
was virtually negligible in Bangladesh. With improvements in balance of
payments and surge in foreign reserves, the government has slowly
started to liberalise such borrowing.
This can be seen by rising
amounts of foreign borrowing. According to BB, net outstanding foreign
currency denominated loans stood at US$ 1.52 billion in 2012 and US$
1.74 billion in 2013.
The BB needs to carefully regulate this
process utilising a time-bound strategy where capital controls are
gradually removed parallel to macroeconomic improvements in Bangladesh.
Ensuring
that capital controls are removed during strong macroeconomic
conditions reduces the risk of capital outflow and keeps Bangladesh
attractive to foreign investors looking to diversify their portfolios.
Additionally,
as the central bank allows foreign borrowing, it has greater
responsibility in terms of rigorously monitoring the amount of foreign
loans availed by the private sector and credit-worthiness of individual
firms and integrity of respective managements.
ADDRESSING BANKING
DILEMMA: For Bangladesh, capital account liberalisation has another
indirect effect. It will obligate local banks to lower their exorbitant
lending rates. At present, lending rate in Bangladesh is around
12-13 per cent - significantly higher than 7.0 per cent-8.0 per
cent rates which the private sector can avail if they borrow from
international capital markets.
Only when foreign borrowing
becomes easily accessible, will the domestic banking sector be compelled
to adopt the discipline necessary to compete with foreign lenders. This
involves greater emphasis on monitoring of the credit worthiness of
clients, focusing on the most productive sectors and bringing down
aggressive lending and lending based on political obligations.
But
even in such improved scenario, banks will not be able to match the
international rates if inflation remains at 7.0 per cent - real rate of
return will be zero or negative.
Therefore, the BB also needs to
strengthen its fight against inflation to allow banks the room needed to
bring down lending rates. In addition to monitoring sector-wise credit
exposure of banks, the BB needs to collaborate with the government to
reduce supply-side bottlenecks in order to achieve the 5.0 per cent
inflation target by 2017.
MONITORING CAPITAL FLIGHT: Any
discussion on capital openness is incomplete without mentioning the
issue of capital flight. According to the latest study conducted by
Global Financial Integrity, capital flight from Bangladesh tripled last
year to almost US$ 1.8 billion.
This amount is huge, in both
absolute and relative terms. For one thing, this is more than half the
amount budgeted for construction of Padma Bridge!
The BB has
definitely put in strong efforts to combat this issue, including
strengthening of the Financial Intelligence Unit. But the process is far
from over. A strong focus for the BB should be to create systems which
detect trade mis-invoicing.
The effectiveness of the commendable
'Dashboard', an electronic monitoring system used to detect fraud in the
banking system, needs to be evaluated in the light of the fact that
capital flight has increased. Furthermore, the BB needs to work closely
with the National Board of Revenue to create automated systems which
share information on foreign trade.
Finally, the BB has to
collaborate with Swiss banks and off-shore financial centres which are
often rumoured to be the likely destinations of illegal money flowing
out of Bangladesh.
A communication and monitoring channel needs
to be created with these overseas destinations to reduce and ultimately
prevent capital flight.
MAINSTREAMING MACRO-PRUDENTIAL
REGULATION: Macro-prudential tools like Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) are
generally used to protect the financial system from changing credit
cycles.
CRR, a quintessential macro-prudential tool, has been
changed only eight times in the last 24 years. We pick a recent
three-year sample during which CRR was changed twice, to study
cyclicality of macro-prudential practice in Bangladesh.
In
October 2009, the Bangladesh Bank increased CRR to 5.0 per cent from 4.5
per cent at a time when excess liquidity (the difference between total
and required liquid assets in the banking sector) stood at around BDT
350,009 million (Source: BB).
In May 2010, when excess liquidity
came down to approximately BDT 307,000 million, the BB raised CRR again
on grounds of containing inflation. But this policy only reduces
liquidity from the system further - in other words, the central bank
showed pro-cyclical tendencies.
Macro-prudential tools like Cash
Reserve Ratio, Capital Requirement, Loan-to-Value Ratio (and others) are
generally utilised to prevent pro-cyclicality of the financial system.
These tools should be utilised counter-cyclically to hedge against
changing credit conditions and prevent a credit bubble or credit crunch.
Recently,
we can see better counter-cyclical practices by the central bank. The
CRR was raised to 6.0 per cent in June 2014 as excess liquidity rose to
BDT 1,022,230 million. This is definitely a good sign. But excess
liquidity has been building up ever since political turmoil began before
2014 elections. Why wait for such a long time to raise the CRR?
Encouragingly,
the BB has directed commercial banks to start implementation of Basel
III which mandates utilisation of macro-prudential tools
counter-cyclically. However, the implementation time-frame is five years
and liquidity conditions in Bangladesh can change several times during
this period.
As such, the BB needs to mainstream macro-prudential
tools into its own operational framework, and utilise Cash Reserve
Ratio counter-cyclically to protect the financial system from credit
shocks.
DEALING WITH NPL CHALLENGE: The issue of high
Non-Performing Loans (NPL) is a long and steadily worsening one.
While the number stands well below 5.0 per cent for countries like
China, India and Malaysia, NPL in Bangladesh is at around 10 per cent.
A
cursory glance at NPL ratios by type of banks makes it evident that
bulk of the problem is due to the state-owned banks. Weak governance,
influence from political forces and sacrificing quality in place of
quantity (when it comes to seeking borrowers) are some of the major
reasons for this predicament.
To add to the growing lack of
discipline in the banking sector, the government recently recapitalised
the scam-hit state-owned banks. As many have pointed out, this is
nothing but a gross misuse of public resources.
Significant
reforms in managing NPL are imperative now. From macro-policy
perspectives, the central bank needs to negotiate with the government to
obtain full control and authority over the state banks.
Next, the BB needs to create a committee which regularly monitors exposure of the banks to different sectors.
Since
sectors such as ship-breaking and real estate have turned out to be
quite risky exposures, the BB needs to create a guideline which limits
exposure to different sectors based on factors such as productivity and
growth prospects; this can be adjusted as an industry's outlook changes.
From
a more micro-perspective, while every bank has its own internal risk
management system, the central bank needs to create a team to identify
whether these risk management frameworks are truly being followed.
It
is well known that the quality of employees vary significantly across
the banking sector and some industry experts have conjectured that
employees often use 'judgment' rather than the actual risk management
tools and frameworks to assess riskiness of loans.
The BB needs to identify how prevalent this activity is, and bring it to the attention of the top management in these banks.
Admittedly,
some of the strategies outlined are more long-term oriented. Designing
them will not only require time, but careful consideration of the
interlink between monetary, macro-financial and banking aspects.
But
the BB's strong track record of ensuring price stability, inclusive
growth and rising vigilance against financial sector indiscipline shows
it certainly has the capacity to undertake these strategies.
The writer is a graduate student of the Department of International Economics, John Hopkins University, Washington DC, USA.
sharjilmuktafi.haque@gmail.com